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Introduction
Charitable giving is common and important. Private households in the US contribute nearly $375 billion dollars to charity annually (Giving USA, 2016) . Hence, understanding what motivates people to give is important. In this paper we focus on one element of the decision process--how the information that solicitors provide regarding their compensation in fundraising campaigns affect charitable giving.
Compensation of the solicitors is a piece of information about a charity that falls into a larger set of considerations regarding how the donated money is used. An example are overhead costs. Bowman (2006) reports that changes in overhead ratios communicate useful information to donors. Bekkers and Wiepking (2011) identify overhead costs as important factor influencing charitable giving as fundraising costs impact on donors' confidence on the campaign (e.g., Sargeant, Ford, and West, 2006) . Gneezy, Keenan, and Gneezy (2014) found that informing potential donors of low overhead costs increased donation rates. Would information regarding how solicitors are paid also affect behavior? Some charities pay solicitors for their work, whereas others do not. In some cases, solicitors wear nametags indicating that they are volunteers, while in other cases, the pay status of solicitors is not revealed at all. Consequently, potential donors must form own beliefs on the compensation of solicitors.
We hypothesize that the information on solicitors' compensation can have important signaling effects. First, when solicitors are not compensated it may signal that they are intrinsically motivated to work. Thus, households may feel empathic and indirectly reward them by donating more. However, information on volunteer work is noisy, as households may not believe that solicitors are telling the truth. If households mistrust this information, they may lower their donations. A solicitor who tells potential donors upfront that he/she is paid may be perceived as 2 more reliable and donors may be less likely to suspect him/her. Potential donors may reciprocate this transparency through increasing their donations.
To test these hypotheses, we conducted a door-to-door fundraising field experiment with more than 2,800 households. Many private donations are collected via door-to-door fundraising campaigns, and field experiments on door-to-door fundraising are a popular instrument to analyze donors' motivations to give (e.g., DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier, 2012; Edwards and List, 2014 were trained to carry out the experiment by acting as door-to-door solicitors.
Our interest was in exploring whether knowing that a solicitor is a paid worker or an unpaid volunteer affects the amount of a charitable donation and the likelihood of donors to make a donation. As such, in each soliciting session, we varied i) whether we paid our undergraduate students for that session and ii) whether our undergraduate students provided information about their payment status to the donor. Table 1 
Procedures
We first provided a training session on how to solicit. Since we wanted all of our solicitors to work in each treatment cell, we agreed on the following compensation scheme with our research assistants. We created routes with 25 houses each and then randomly assigned them to solicitors. 3 A day of work was broken into four routes, 5 whereby two routes were completed in the morning and two were completed in the afternoon.
Solicitors were always provided with two routes of paid work and two routes where they received no compensation. The paid work was compensated at $25 per route and volunteering time was uncompensated. Upon arriving to the site, each solicitor flipped a coin to determine whether the morning would consist of a paid route followed by an unpaid route, or vice versa. Solicitors then flipped another coin to determine whether the afternoon would consist of a paid route followed by an unpaid route or vice versa. We also randomly assigned whether we ran the information treatments either in the afternoon or the morning (the remaining part of the day was assigned to no information). The solicitors' treatment assignment therefore determined which treatment each household was assigned to. No solicitors declined to participate in the unpaid sessions, generating a balanced dataset of paid/unpaid conditions.
Upon visiting each household, solicitors were required to record key information about each visit. This also included details on whether or not they approached the house (houses with a 'no soliciting' sign were not approached), whether the door was opened, whether the individual donated, the amount of the donation. Solicitors also recorded the gender and race of the person opening the door. They were instructed not to indicate or create the impression that this was an experiment.
6 3. Results
Data
Solicitors approached 2,608 households, of which 1,037 opened the door. 4 The neighborhood was relatively wealthy: the mean annual income of the approached households was US$102,977 (sd= 14,387). 5 Of those households who opened the door 92% were white and 49% were female. Table   2 presents summary statistics on the approached households in the treatments. It demonstrates that we have a balanced treatment assignment. That is, in all treatments the solicitors approached more than 90% of the households which were assigned. Of the approached households, roughly 40% opened the door in each treatment. Moreover, we had a similar number of males/females and white persons in each treatment. 
Main Results
In this section we start by reporting our main results on the average donation levels (in $) in our different treatments. Figure 1 overviews the average donation levels (in $) of households who opened the door. The data is unconditional on the decision to donate. 6 Summary statistics on donations rates and donations levels by treatment and by gender are provided in Table A1 in Appendix A. Figure B1 in Appendix B presents the distribution of donation rates by treatment. Notes: Estimates for an ordinary least squares model, with standard errors in parenthesis. All data conditional on the door being opened are included. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. The regressions include fixed effects for the solicitor. Controls include for household income, household ownership of the house/apartment, donor being white, and for the hour of day. Model 1 focuses on the data of the unpaid solicitors, whereas Model 2 concentrates on the data of paid solicitors. We apply these sub-sample regressions to better interpret the potential interaction effects of solicitors' payment status and the role of providing households with this information. In these models we incorporate the following regressors: information is a dummy which is positive when the solicitor informs the households of her compensation. compensation, solicitors may signal their motivation with facial expressions and other cues (see Small, 2014, 2016) .
Intensive and Extensive Margin
In the previous section, we analyzed the effect of treatments on donation levels. Our main result was that donations increase, if female donors learn that a solicitor is paid.
In this section, we analyze the underlying drivers of these effects. More precisely, we study whether this effect is driven by a) increased donation levels conditional on giving (intensive margin), or b) an increased donation 11 probability (extensive margin), or c) a combination of both effects. Therefore, Figure 2 focuses on the probability that households donate in the treatments.
Figure 2: Overview Donation Rates
Notes: Donors can decide to donate any possible amount. The bar graph depicts the donation rates (in %) in the treatments. Data for male, female, and all donors are reported. Only data of households that opened the door are included. The bars for "All Subjects" contain observations of male and female donors as well as a small number of observations without a record of donors' gender.
It turns out that, when solicitors communicate that they are paid the likelihood to give increases from 16% to 19%. Figure 2 emphasizes that this is again driven by female households, who increase the likelihood to donate from 15% to 23% when knowing that the solicitor is compensated. Thus, there is a weak effect on the donation probability. By contrast, the donation likelihood of men even slightly decreases from 18% down to 16% when being informed that solicitors are compensated. Comparing Figures 1 and 2 it appears logical to expect that the combination of both, the intensive and the extensive margin, leads to the treatment effect. This impression is supported by additional regression analyzes presented in likelihood to give which is captured by donation rates (Models 5-8). Notes: Models 1-4: estimates for an ordinary least squares model; Models 5-8: estimates for a linear probability model. Standard errors in parenthesis. Models 1-4: Only data from those donors, who make positive donations are included; Models 5-8: All data conditional on the door being opened are included. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. The regressions include fixed effects for the solicitor. For Models 1-4 Adj. Rsquared, while for Models 5-8 R-squared is reported. Controls include for household income, household ownership of the house/apartment, donor being white, and for the hour of day.
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The models in Table 4 illustrate that the treatment effects we observe are driven partly by effects on the intensive margin and partly by the effects on the intensive margin. For example, we see a weakly significant effect of information x female donor in Model 2, and a weekly significant effect of paid x information x female donor in Models 7-8. Neither the results on donation rates conditional on giving nor the results on dotation rates are robust. This indicates that the treatment effect is induced by both factors working together. Also, since both results are weaker than the overall result, and the sample size is lower in the "conditional on giving" Models 1-6, we may be low on power. We summarize our findings as follows:
Result 3: In Paid-Info, the donation amount of female donors is higher as a consequence of an increased likelihood to give and higher conditional donations.
Discussion and Conclusion
In our field experiment, informing potential donors regarding solicitors' compensation significantly increased willingness to give. Interestingly, this only holds for female donors and only when being informed that solicitors are paid. Why do female donors positively react to the signal of a paid solicitor? A potential explanation is gender differences in trusting behavior. The literature on gender differences in preferences (Croson and Gneezy, 2009) reports that women are less trusting than men (e.g., Eckel and Wilson, 2004; Slonim and Guillen, 2010) . As a result, women may trust the solicitor less when they have less information on the solicitor's motivation, or when solicitors claim they are volunteers.
14 Our result suggest that organizations could benefit from communicating the compensation scheme they provide to their solicitors. More generally, the results suggest that more transparency from the organization may increase trust and donations.
Appendix -For Online Distribution
Appendix A: Tables Notes: Donors can decide to donate any possible amount. The first column contains average donation levels in US$ (standard errors in parenthesis). The second contains average donations of all donors with positive donations. Third column indicates the donation probability. In the last column reports the number of observations (of observations with positive donations in parenthesis). Only data of households that opened the door are included. The rows "All" contain observations of male and female donors as well as a small number of observations without a record of donors' gender.
